The Deficit For Those Economics Classes Essays - Fiscal Policy

The Deficit for Those Economics Classes here's one on the deficit for those economics classes Subject: the deficit good or bad Deficit Spending ?Spending financed not by current tax receipts, but by borrowing or drawing upon past tax reserves.? , Is it a good idea? Why does the U.S. run a deficit? Since 1980 the deficit has grown enormously. Some say its a bad thing, and predict impending doom, others say it is a safe and stable necessity to maintain a healthy economy. When the U.S. government came into existence and for about a 150 years thereafter the government managed to keep a balanced budget. The only times a budget deficit existed during these first 150 years were in times of war or other catastrophic events. The Government, for instance, generated deficits during the War of 1812, the recession of 1837, the Civil War, the depression of the 1890s, and World War I. However, as soon as the war ended the deficit would be eliminated and the economy which was much larger than the amounted debt would quickly absorb it. The last time the budget ran a surplus was in 1969 during Nixon's presidency. Budget deficits have grown larger and more frequent in the last half-century. In the 1980s they soared to record levels. The Government cut income tax rates, greatly increased defense spending, and didn't cut domestic spending enough to make up the difference. Also, the deep recession of the early 1980s reduced revenues, raising the deficit and forcing the Government to spend much more on paying interest for the national debt at a time when interest rates were high. As a result, the national debt grew in size after 1980. It grew from $709 billion to $3.6 trillion in 1990, only one decade later. Increase of National Debt Since 1980 Month Amount -------------------------------------------- 12/31/1980 $930,210,000,000.00 * 12/31/1981 $1,028,729,000,000.00 * 12/31/1982 $1,197,073,000,000.00 * 12/31/1983 $1,410,702,000,000.00 * 12/31/1984 $1,662,966,000,000.00 * 12/31/1985 $1,945,941,616,459.88 12/31/1986 $2,214,834,532,586.43 12/31/1987 $2,431,715,264,976.86 12/30/1988 $2,684,391,916,571.41 12/29/1989 $2,952,994,244,624.71 12/31/1990 $3,364,820,230,276.86 12/31/1991 $3,801,698,272,862.02 12/31/1992 $4,177,009,244,468.77 12/31/1993 $4,535,687,054,406.14 12/30/1994 $4,800,149,946,143.75 10/31/1995 $4,985,262,110,021.06 11/30/1995 $4,989,329,926,644.31 12/29/1995 $4,988,664,979,014.54 01/31/1996 $4,987,436,358,165.20 02/29/1996 $5,017,040,703,255.02 03/29/1996 $5,117,786,366,014.56 04/30/1996 $5,102,048,827,234.22 05/31/1996 $5,128,508,504,892.80 06/28/1996 $5,161,075,688,140.93 07/31/1996 $5,188,888,625,925.87 08/30/1996 $5,208,303,439,417.93 09/30/1996 $5,224,810,939,135.73 10/01/1996 $5,234,730,786,626.50 10/02/1996 $5,235,509,457,452.56 10/03/1996 $5,222,192,137,251.62 10/04/1996 $5,222,049,625,819.53 * Rounded to Millions Federal spending has grown over the years, especially starting in the 1930s in actual dollars and in proportion to the economy (Gross Domestic Product, or GDP). Beginning with the "New Deal" in the 1930s, the Federal Government came to play a much larger role in American life. President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to use the full powers of his office to end the Great Depression. He and Congress greatly expanded Federal programs. Federal spending, which totaled less than $4 billion in 1931, went up to nearly $7 billion in 1934 and to over $8 billion in 1936. Then, U.S. entry into World War II sent annual Federal spending soaring to over $91 billion by 1944. Thus began the ever increasing debt of the United States. What if the debt is not increasing as fast as we think it is? The dollar amount of the debt may increase but often times so does the amount of money or GDP to pay for the debt. This brings up the idea that the deficit could be run without cost. How could a deficit increase productivity without any cost? The idea of having a balanced budget is challenged by the ideas of Keynesian Economics. Keynesian economics is an economic model that predicts in times of low demand and high unemployment a deficit will not cost anything. Instead a deficit would allow more people to work, increasing productivity. A deficit does this because it is invested into the economy by government. For example if the government spends deficit money on new highways, trucking will benefit and more jobs will be produced. When an economic system is in recession all of its resources are not being used. For example if the government did not build highways we could not ship goods and there would be less demand for them. The supply remains low even though we have the ability to produce more because we cannot ship them. This non-productivity comes at a cost to the whole economic system. If deficit spending eliminates non-productivity then its direct monetary cost will be offset if not surpassed by increased productivity. For example in the 1980's when the huge deficits were adding up the actual additions to the public capital or increased productivity were often as big, or bigger than the deficit.

Compare and contrast the ways in which Owen and Sassoon present images of suffering and death in Exposure and The Hero Essays

Compare and contrast the ways in which Owen and Sassoon present images of suffering and death in Exposure and The Hero Essays Compare and contrast the ways in which Owen and Sassoon present images of suffering and death in Exposure and The Hero Essay Compare and contrast the ways in which Owen and Sassoon present images of suffering and death in Exposure and The Hero Essay Essay Topic: A Long Way Gone Owen and Sassoon are both famous poets, who wrote their poems during and about the First World War. Wilfred Owen was very descriptive poet, who wrote in great details about all that he saw, using much poetic and flowing language. Siegfried Sassoon however was very cynical about the people running the war, and could not see a point in all the death going on all around. However, they both fought in the war and since they should have many experiences of war in common, their poems should surely have very common themes and views, and those should be typical of the time. However, after examining the poems closely, one can determine that there are a great amount of differences between the two poems. In Exposure, Owen uses much descriptive language to allow the reader to perfectly understand and almost feel the suffering that is going on in this war. He describes the wind as iced and knifing, which in itself would be painful; he personifies the wind to a point, because it is stabbing him, and only humans can do that. The suffering and pain that is going on will not and cannot stop, since in the distance, incessantly, the flickering gunnery rumbles. Owen seems to convey a sense of misery and hopelessness upon the whole situation. He even makes the morning sound miserable, since normally dawn means a fresh start, new beginnings, new hope; whereas here, dawn is simply a bringer of poignant misery. This emotion is quite sharp, stinging and painful. Owen also manages to separate war from everyday life, because the soldiers no longer know what is happening elsewhere: We only know war lasts, rain soaks, and clouds sag stormy. The use of the word sag seems to indicate gloominess and almost apathy, as if the clouds could no longer care to hold themselves in shape. Even the enemy (which in this case is the start of a new day which has been personified) is melancholy; everyone is suffering, there is no point to this war. If both sides are suffering, he seems to say, why should they both continue to go through this misery? Finally, to end the isolation felt by all, and to finalise the general amount of suffering and isolation that is being experience, Owen says that the love of God seems dying. The situation cannot get more desperate, and yet, in their hour of need, no help comes, and the desolation and pain just continues. However, in The Hero, suffering and pain is portrayed quite differently. Since the subject matter is completely different, the reasons and methods of portraying pain obviously differ. This poem is much more cynical in comparison to Exposure, because here the only suffering that is endured is purely due to second hand relation of news. The mothers voice is described as tired, perhaps because she has been completely drained by the news that her son is dead. Tired here seems to indicate that she has had enough. The anguish that she is going through comes out more with her voice that quavered to a choke. Quavering describes the voice almost wobbling, perhaps due to the mother crying, and the fact that it went to a choke shows how much this news has affected her. She tails off involuntarily, and is obviously choked and so overpowered by her grief that she cannot continue talking. This section of the poem describes her grief very delicately, like how Owen describes the elements of nature v ery carefully in Exposure. However, once we get to the third stanza, we find out the main truth of what happened to Jack, and the poem suddenly becomes very critical of authority, and it also becomes generally callous overall. Normally, one does not insult the memory of the dead, but here, the Brother Officer thinks about Jack in blunt terms; not softening the memory of his death at all, but just casually thinking what he thought at the time. The way he calls Jack a useless swine demonstrates this perfectly, swine highlighting how low his opinion was of Jack whilst he was still alive. He also calls him, although not out loud, cold-footed, showing how cowardly he was. Perhaps the insults were because Jack could simply not stand the suffering in the trenches however, since the Brother Officer doesnt think like that, the reader is still exposed to his criticism. This is completely unlike how Owen describes suffering, with great detail and much description; Sassoon just goes straight to the point. In both poems, there are also many mentions of death as a theme, and death is so final, that surely there should be only one way to describe it. However, since Owen and Sassoon have very differing views, the ways in which they portray death are very different. Wilfred Owen has many mentions of death in the final few stanzas of Exposure, whereas The Hero has many mentions of death throughout the poem, since the whole poem is referring to the death of Jack. In Exposure, Owen makes various mentions of death, which adds to the overall gloom and almost apprehension of what is to come throughout the poem. The narrator is sure that death is near: - Is it that we are dying?. You could also interpret snow-dazed as being close to death, since the soldiers are almost paralysed by the cold, which comes as such a shock that they are almost hypnotised and lose all their knowledge of what is going on around them. Again, Owen reinforces this with sun-dozed, which seems to imply that the soldiers are just lying on the ground, looking at the sun. He calls the soldiers drowsing- perhaps because they are close to death. The reminiscence that occurs in stanza 6 could be introspection and vision of their past before death. Our ghosts drag home: the very word drag shows how tired the soldiers are in life, and how much they want to be resting, preferably at home. The final mention of death is at the very end of the poem, in the final stanza, where many soldiers and in a way the narrator are described as being dead by the end of the evening. This shows in how Owen describes the frost as being fastened on the people, and the frost damages the bodies. Shrivelling many hands and the use of the word shrivelling really brings home the reality of death, but yet again, it is described in a very detailed, descriptive way. And finally, the bodies are removed by the burying-party, who pause over half-known faces. The dead were once alive and known by the living, but now that is gone. Finally, part of the very final line is the most haunting of all: all their eyes are ice, describing the burying-party, people who are still living, but yet are almost dead at the same time. Sassoon on the other hand in this case gives neither any dignity to the dead, nor to the Brother Officer who holds no respect for Jack. The way that Sassoon describes his death is very short, blunt and straight to the point: Blown to small bits. No mention of him even being human once, no long descriptive words; instead he is almost de-personified by the bluntness and the lack of caring that is shown to his death by anyone except his mother. Apathy seems to be a common theme here with Exposure, since the burying-party do not show much respect towards these dead, because they have seen so many. They no longer care about the matter of death, and neither does the Brother Officer. The fact that only Jacks mother cares about his death is quite poignant, and it does give a sense that there were so many casualties that people became immune to feeling suffering about death after a while. There are few similarities between these poems, but many differences. This is unexpected, since both poems are written at the same time about the same war, yet ultimately it is the personality and personal views of the author that influences what is written about.

Fracking and water pollution Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Fracking and water pollution - Research Paper Example fracking fluid, comprising of common toxins and carcinogens such as uranium, lead, mercury, methanol, formaldehyde, hydrochloric acid, ethane glycol etc (Spellman, 2013). Waste water resulting from fracking usually has a lot of potentially poisonous chemicals from the fracking fluid and natural contaminants from very deep in the ground, comprising of totally dissolved solids (such as barium, salts and strontium)radioactive materials like Radium 226 as well as organic pollutants like toluene and benzene. About thirty to seventy percent of all the fluid utilised in fracking is likely to resurface, and thus requires treatment. In addition, fracking discharges â€Å"produced water† mainly from underground which also ascends onto the surface, and mostly can be somewhere from two to two hundred times as much water, something dependent on the water/gas/oil absorption in the shale configuration. It has been proved therefore beyond any reasonable doubt that waste water arising due to fracking has a lot of possibly dangerous chemicals that were used in the fracking liquid, in addition to deep underground natural contaminants (Spellman, 2013). For these contaminants and chemicals to be removed, all techniques of wastewater management (comprising of reuse, recycling as well as injecting into dumping wells) normally entail some kind of treatment. Eventually, wastewater can be pumped to treatment works that are publicly owned or rather to dedicated industrial or brine wastewater plants, also known as centralized waste treatment plants, which might also add precipitation and coagulation methods in removing of dissolved solids. All treatment techniques produce residuals-which basically are waste materials, mainly in sludge, liquid or solid form, that mostly stay after treatment. Because of public concerns regarding the huge volumes of water used in hydraulic drilling, gas and oil fracturing corporations have begun not only reusing but also recycling the wastewater (Spellman,

The Vietnam War that made 1968 a Unique Year Essay

The Vietnam War that made 1968 a Unique Year - Essay Example Relevant information about the war is also recorded by Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich, in the book, The International. This essay borrows most of the information from the two authors plus others and shows what they had in common. This will clearly bring out the full information regarding this horrific war in the rest of this essay. Vietnam War contributed to 1968 being a unique year in world history. It was on January 31, 1968, when the Tet Offensive was launched by the North Vietnamese together with Viet Cong forces which caused mass destruction and heavy losses to the U.S. and the South Vietnamese (Ehrenreich & John, 121). This was the lunar New Year holiday which was called Tet when attacks were made in the South Vietnam, out of which more than 100 towns were fiercely attacked. North Vietnam which is actually a communist society was in fight with their allies South Vietnam, a communist society and which obtained a back-up from the US army troops to fight the North Vietnamese (Kurlansky, 106). It was General Vo Nguyen Giap who came up with the plan of carrying out offensive attacks to South Vietnamese. The fight was so fierce and despite the fact that the U.S and the South Vietnamese were able to hold off the attacks made by the communists, they lost the battle to the North Vietnam (Ehrenreich & John, 122). However, North Vietnam suffered many casualties but victoriously pushe d out America from the region and this was regarded as the first phase of the battle which became to be the most famous. Thus, Vietnam War contributed to 1968 being a unique year in world history.

Miscarriages of Justice Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Miscarriages of Justice - Essay Example This happens because of inefficient procedures . Second, the laws that are applied to them. Third, for there is no information that justifies the applied treatment or punishment. Fourth, if suspects, defendants or convicts are handled unfavorably by the state to an unequal extent compared with the necessity to protect the rights of others; or, fifth, if the rights of other persons are not effectively or equally protected or defended by State action against law violators or, sixth, by State law itself(Greer, 1986). For, the six groups above revolve around themes of breach of rights of suspects and defendants, the disproportionate treatment of suspects/defendants or the non-vindication of the rights of victims, might be termed direct miscarriages. In addition, it may be possible to derive from their infliction a seventh, indirect miscarriage which affects the community as a whole. A belief coming out of deceit or illegalities will corrode the state's claims to legitimacy. For, this is founded on the community criminal justice system's values which includes as respect for individual rights. In this way, as well as the unwanted faith of the individual, the "moral integrity of the criminal process" suffers harm(McConville, 1994). Also, there could be a common detriment by way of diminished confidence in the vanguards of law and order leading to lesser active citizens aiding the police and a decrease in the number of jurors willing to convict even the glaringly "guilty".Definitely, it has been deba ted that this indirect form of miscarriage can exist independently as well as contingently in two respects. One is that a breach of "the principle of judicial legitimacy" should be of concern even if there is an accurate and fair determination of guilt or innocence. Secondly, it still produces great moral harm even if, so far as the individual is concerned, there is an error but no real harm is inflicted (say, when a person imprisoned for life is wrongfully convicted soon afterwards of a minor motoring offence). It is therefore argued that the State itself should avoid actions or processes which might damage the integrity of the system. Consistent with this concern, lawyers, whether acting for prosecution or defence, are reminded that they are not the ciphers of their clients but owe duties of integrity to the criminal justice system(Poole, 1998). Critical examination why gender related crime is important to understanding relevant policies of the criminal justice policyIn the article stated that the gender equality duty and the criminal justice system April 2007: The Gender Equality Duty comes in to force, the gender equality duty has been the biggest radical metamorphosis to sex to sex discrimination law for the past thirty years. It is also similar to the introduction in 2001 of a similar public sector race equality duty after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and the introduction of a disability equality duty in December 2006. Furthermore, Fawcett publications of the Fawcett Society had published two reports to support the implementation of the Gender Equality Duty in the criminal justice system: The responsibility to understanding the "understand your duty" section details how the law should affect the criminal just

Effects of Manipulating Individual Identity

Effects of Manipulating Individual Identity Abstract: This study examined how changing the perception of social distance changed the way in which subjects interacted in the Trust Game specifically looking into the social preferences they displayed. A discussion of both economic and sociological research demonstrates the inherent variability of social identity and social distance and the interconnected nature these concepts have with social preferences. A two-stage experiment involving subjects of different nationalities and genders was carried out with a different identity focus in each stage. Findings show that subjects exhibit greater social preferences when interacting with those of a similar focused identity yet the degrees of these preferences displayed vary in accordance to the identity focus. Results suggest that social distance, although easily manipulated, is a powerful force in interactions. The results are consistent with previous studies into group membership, identity, nationality, gender and social preferences. Given this studys far-reaching implications it should be viewed as the premise for future study of this topic. Introduction The concept of social distance as elucidated by Akerlof (1997) is profoundly linked with social identity and social preferences. It is the differences in individuals social identities, including for example, race, gender, class and status, that determine the benefits of interaction and to what extent of social preferences are displayed. Yet when individuals are not entirely familiar with each other, the perception of social identities is based on very few observations and is therefore not entirely accurate. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether or not variations in the perception of social identity, and thus social distance, will affect the extent to which social preferences are manifested. Studies on the effect of identity are in no way new. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) studied its relevance and magnitude with regards to gender discrimination in the workplace, poverty and social exclusion, and the household division of labour. Akerlof (1997) also studied the effect of social distance, asserting that the social identity of individuals can substantially affect their interactions. What has not been tested, however, is to what extent identity is merely a perception. Individuals can and do possess multiple identities varying in dominance from situation to situation. The hypothesis of this paper is that social preferences are relevant in experimental games, but these are dependent on how each player perceives the others social identity, a perception that is inherently variable. Players react with varying degrees of self-interest according to the identity they perceive, even when identical character profiles are involved. Recent economic studies fail to sufficiently incorporate current sociological thinking as to the nature of social identity and although this study will give evidence for the relevance of social distance in determining degrees of social preferences, it will attempt to shed light on individuals inconsistent perception of the distance between them. In order to add weight to this position, an experiment was organised in which participants of various profiles were invited to play the Trust Game. Each game was played face-to-face with no verbal communication. The experiment was divided into two stages, a nationality focused stage and a gender focused stage. Each participant played the game twice and never with the same opposing player. Before each game, participants were assigned to certain rooms in which video clips were played depending on the identity focused on. In the first stage, participants were split into three rooms, one for each nationality present: Scottish, English and Chinese. After one play of the Trust Game, the experiment commenced its second stage and participants were split into two rooms, one for each gender, and again asked to play the game. The results show that there is significant variation in the degrees of social preferences displayed depending on the identity being focused on hereafter referred to as the focused identity. When nationality was the focused identity, those with this common identity exhibited greater social preferences than those of differing nationalities, regardless of gender. When gender was the focused identity, those with this common identity exhibited greater social preferences than those of differing gender, regardless, to some extent, of nationality. This lack of consistency shows that the perception of social distance is not a constant through both stages and yet it is still proves to be a determining factor in how players interact. The following content of this paper is arranged into four sections. Section 2 will address the relevant literature with regards to social preferences and identity, showing their relevance, interconnected nature and inherent variability, discussing the application of various theories in the context of this study. Section 3 will describe the design and implementation of the experiment used in this study with the results, analysis and comparisons to similar studies presented in Section 4. An interpretation of these results and further conclusions will be offered in Section 5. Theories of Preferences and Identity To clearly understand the argument presented, a holistic discussion of current theories must be embarked upon. The relevance of social preferences and the forms of their analysis through experimental games will be examined in this section to create the context in which this study is placed. The concepts of identity and how they shape perceptions and interactions will then be considered before discussing their relationship with social preferences. Social Preferences The assumption that man is motivated by self-interest is one that has dominated economic theory and is indeed fundamental to the very ideology of the vast majority of economists. As Adam Smith (1910:13) suggests, It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. Inherent in this analogy is the implication that self-interest is the primary motivator in our economic interactions, and it is through this impulse that equilibria are formed. In Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium is obtained by each player assuming the other possesses purely selfish motives. This assumption, however, is not always consistent with reality. Many factors influence an individuals decisions and it is evident that the maximisation of material gain is not always a dominating motivation. Some of the factors influencing an individuals decisions can relate to social status, group membership, inequity aversion, reciprocity, s pite, envy, altruism and identity. These factors form a preference set, referred to in this study as social preferences. Although the theory of self-interest has been ingrained in traditional economics, modern economists have increasingly questioned this supposition. In fact the traditional authors of this theory were also wary of its realism. Even though Edgeworth (1881:16) writes that the first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest, he concedes that Man is, in reality, for the most part an impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian, (Edgeworth 1881:104). It is evident that we are influenced by unselfish motives in our interactions with others and it follows that these interactions will in many circumstances involve material profit and loss. This is the realm of social preferences. Amartya Sen (1977:336), in his seminal paper on the irrationality of traditional preference theory states that the purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron. He argues that theories that do not encompass the influence of sympathy and our commitment to it are incomplete. It is the result of this basic emotion that our social norms, laws and codes of conduct are formed and without which no society would be feasible (Johansen 1977). In various studies into social preferences, it is seen that they are comprised of multiple aspects. Reciprocity, inequity aversion, altruism and trust are all basic components of this preference set (Andreoni et al. 2002). When kindness or animosity is shown, the impulse exists to reciprocate in like manner. When inequity exists, the urge exists to rebel against it. Altruism is the virtue that depends on no form of expected gain or reciprocity, the purest form of good will. Trust is the confidence in the future actions of another and is arguably the most variable of the social preferences and one that will be revisited in this study. Each of these attributes are far from abstract philosophical concepts, exert great influence on our economic interactions. Agell and Lundberg (1995) discovered that as a result of workers being influenced by fairness and equity customs, wage cuts were often unprofitable, with workers objecting to an unfair action. This can have a direct impact on the extent that a company vertically integrates, with out-sourcing often being far more viable given the reciprocal attitude of workers. Bewley (1999) also noted that a firms policy can affect worker morale and as such companies must take into account the perceived fairness of their policies. The extent of tax evasion has also been correlated to how fair it is perceived, and in fact the entire structure of tax systems are thoroughly debated and altered according to the principles of equity and merit (Seidl and Traub 2002). The perception of unreciprocated generosity has been one of the causes of the general reduction in support from the US w elfare state. People are disinclined to support welfare structures that give the impression that they are helping a poor segment of society that refuse to help themselves, content to live off the goodwill of others (Bowles and Gintis 2000). Fukuyama (1995) also correlates economic prosperity with higher levels of trust, suggesting that social preferences are a very powerful force even in the current global economic system. Sequential games Although the examples given are wide-ranging in scope, involving relatively large economic issues, social preferences have also been proven to have a significant effect on individual interactions. Previously experimental games have been used to prove the dominating forces of self-interest, the equilibria of these experiments being calculated by assuming that all agents were exclusively self-interested (Fehr and Schmict, 2001). Recently, economists have carried out several experiments involving non-cooperative games that contradict this presumption. Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) were among the first to create a game that did just this. It is called the Ultimatum Game. There are two players in the game, one a Proposer and one a Responder. The Proposer must divide an amount of money X between the two players, offering the Responder any amount Y = X. If Responder accepts, the Proposer receives the remaining money X – Y, if they reject, both receive nothing. Under self-interested preferences, the efficient equilibrium is the one in which the Proposer gives the least amount possible to the Responder, who will accept any amount. In reality however, offers of less than a fifth of X are rejected about half time and Proposers anticipating this generally offer around 30 to 50 percent of X (Hoffman et al. 1996). This result clearly shows that factors other than self-interest are at play. It would be reasonable to assume that altruism and reciprocity both play a part in the decision-making process of both players. The Proposer may be influenced by a code of morals and a concept of fairness to offer more than the standard equilibrium distribution. The P roposer must also take into account the Responders sense of reciprocity and animosity towards a seemingly unfair distribution. Although the Responder is under no monetary incentive to reject a low offer, yet his social preferences mean that he is able to achieve some utility by spiting the Proposer, thereby valuing a certain amount of reciprocity over monetary value. Given the fact that the Proposers actions may be driven only by the fear of reciprocity and no sense of altruism, it is worthwhile to look into the Dictators Game first introduced by Kahneman et al. (1986) and refined by Forsythe et al. (1994). In this game, the Responder, now called the Recipient, is not given the option to accept or refuse the amount given by the Proposer. If the Proposer is motivated by self-interested alone, they will offer nothing to the Recipient but as many experiments have shown, this is not always the case. Henrich et al. (2001) find that in most dictator game experiments there is a primary mode offer of zero percent of the Proposers total wealth and a secondary mode offer of 50 percent. Some groups show a primary mode offer of 20 percent and a secondary mode of 50 percent providing strong evidence of inequity aversion. In addition to supporting the notion that man is not exclusively self-interested, studies also confirm that fear of reciprocity is present i n the Ultimatum Game and that Proposers apply backwards induction with average offers being lower in the Dictator Game (Roth et al. 1991). The Trust Game, developed by Berg et al. (1995) is a game that can be used to test the presence of altruism, inequity aversion, reciprocity and its namesake, trust. The game is played with an Investor and a Trustee, with the former being given an initial endowment of X and the latter given nothing. The Investor is then able to give any amount Y between 0 and X. The amount the Trustee receives will be tripled, amounting to 3Y. The Trustee is then given the option to give any amount Z between 0 and 3Y back to the Investor thereby making the payoffs of the Investor and the Trustee X – Y + Z and 3Y – Z respectively. The Trustee is under no monetary incentive to return any amount and as such, under strictly self-interested preferences the Investor will predict this and give the Trustee nothing but, as with the Ultimatum and Dictator Games, studies show that many players of the Trust Game deviate from this equilibrium. Berg et al. (1995) find that almost all Investors give so me amount of money to the Trustee and that a substantial number of Trustees return at least the same amount and that a third even returned more than they received. The amount returned also increases with the amount given thus supporting the theory that reciprocity is an integral part of many preference sets. Investors and Trustees are able to display inequity aversion by choosing to give or return amounts that will equalise final payoffs. Trustees can also display altruism by returning anything over and above the amount needed to equalise payoffs. It is interesting to note that there is substantial variation in the amounts given, with no clear average amount entrusted. The variation is not unsurprising, however, given the inherent inconsistency in levels of trust that individuals demonstrate in their interactions with various individuals. In society, trust placed in an individual is dependent on who that individual is or, in other terms, trust placed is dependent on the perceived id entity of the individual in question. Identity Identity, at its most fundamental level, is at the base of all human interaction. For an individual to interact with another, the individual must have a clear concept of both himself and of the other. It is in the consideration of these two concepts that decisions are made. Descartes (1912:167) famously stated †¦I think, therefore I am, and in doing so sparked off the philosophical debate on what truly directs our thoughts and actions. Hume (1888) further develops this by exploring our perception of ourselves, our identity. It was his belief that we can only perceive ourselves, and build our identity, by categorisation in the light of selected characteristics and never perceive our true reality in objective terms. It is out-with the bounds of this study to discuss in depth the sociological and psychological complexities of this topic, yet it is worth-while bringing to light some key concepts to further the understanding of the interactions between this studys participants. An identity is a tool of recognition. It allows us to recognise individuals, categories, groups and types of individuals, Wiley (1994:130). More than this, it is also a tool of categorisation and emotional cues. It implies a conscious awareness by members of a group, some positive or negative emotional feelings towards the characteristics which members of a group perceive themselves as sharing and in which they perceive themselves as differing from others, Mennell (1994:177). Goffman (1968) further expounds these aspects of recognition by dividing identity into three sections: the personal identity, the ego identity and the social identity. The personal identity is the unique identification that each individual possesses to differentiate themselves technically, legally and realistically from all others. The ego identity is a purely subjective observation that is built from a multitude of social experiences and is a sense of ones own particular state and nature. The social identity pr ovides a way of categorising people and connects each person with a set of attributes and characteristics thought to be in keeping with the members of their respective categories. Individuals that possess commonalities in the form of thought, action, nature, experience or lifestyle can all be grouped into various social identities. Examples of social identities are nationality, gender, music-taste, age, profession and political views. It is important to stress that while individuals may only hold one personal and ego identity, they are able to juggle multiple social identities which have varying degrees of focus from situation to situation. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) put forward the theorem that our perception of our ego identity can have a significant influence on our decisions and actions. Their theorem sheds light on a number of seemingly irrational choices. Actions that are of apparent detriment to an individual can be viewed as a form of behaviour that it used to create a more unique self identity. Similarly, steps may be taken to symbolise the assumption of a particular identity or the membership of a certain group, be they conscious or otherwise. Men do not generally wear dresses, and as such this behavioural code is unconsciously subscribed to by the majority of men. Any behaviour to the contrary poses a challenge not merely to the social norm, but to the identity of manhood itself. Attempts to manipulate an individuals decisions can be based on the notion of identity. In order to influence people to buy their products, companies create advertisements that often show a stylised form of a particular identity that people may aspire to. Finally, as identity can play such a large role in determining our economic decisions and behaviour, and assuming that individuals can choose their own identity, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) conclude that identity choices can be a major factor in a persons overall economic well-being, a conclusion strengthened by the theory of role-identities. It is difficult to determine to what extent our identity is prescriptive or descriptive in relation to our own actions, but nevertheless the dual concepts of identity and role are deeply interconnected. Lyman and Scott (1970:136) clarify this link by stating that roles are identities mobilised in a specific situation; whereas role is always situationally specific, identities are trans-situational. By assuming an identity, we also assume a role. Despite that the fact that this role varies from situation to situation, it is at all times consistent with the assumed identity. It is from this notion that expectations and metaperspectives are formed. Laing et al. (1966) pioneered the belief that it is not I but you that is important. More specifically they claimed that we are all deeply influenced by considering our view of others view of ourselves and in such a way develop a role-performance that conforms to the expectation others have of our behaviour so as to receive positive feedback o r avoid negative feedback. In order to assess these expectations and act accordingly, we must first judge what these expectations are. With strangers, this is problematic, and as such we orient ourselves toward them in terms only of the ill-specified contours of their social roles, (McCall and Simmons, 1978:70). In this respect, we are only able to form rough estimations of a persons true identity and thereby rely on our perception of how they fit into vague boundaries of social identities. When we perceive people this way, our perception of the attributes they possess as ascribed by their social identity is often completely arbitrary when viewed in the context of an objective character analysis. The perception and reality can at times be poles apart, decreasing in accuracy with increasing social distance. Identities and Social Preferences Akerlof (1997) defined social distance as a measure of social proximity between individuals. The model he created summarises that people gain benefits from interacting to those socially closer to themselves, with these benefits decreasing with isolation. This model is supported by empirical evidence that suggests that trust and reciprocity are linked with social connection and that members of the same nationality and race exhibit greater degrees of these attributes towards one another (Glaeser et al. 1999). A common method of analysing social distance is through the construction of groups in experiments and many studies of this kind have provided quite significant results. Studying the effects of group membership on cooperation, Orbell et al. (1988) find that subjects are far more likely to cooperate with in-group members than out-group members, with 79% of participants showing cooperation with the former and only 30% showing cooperation with the latter. Through using a variation on the dictator game, Frey and Bohnet (1997) also showed how group membership affects social preferences. The experiment observed that in-group members were allocated far more of the total endowment than out-group members suggesting some correlation with membership and altruism and inequity aversion. An important finding of the literature on the topic of group membership is that subjects react to membership in a very subjective manner, disregarding objective considerations. Billing and Tajfel (1973) observe that the even most minimal connections within a group still give rise to in-group positive discrimination. Although subjects realised that the basis of group composition wa s entirely random, they still discriminated toward their fellow members in a very significant way. The fact that the weakest bonds are able to create positive in-group interaction is an important consideration when examining the relation between perceptions of social identity and expressions of social preferences. While group membership is a powerful force, transnational studies have shown that the cooperation inducing group mentality is not a universally consistent attribute. Buchan, Croson and Johnson (1999) find that subjects from the U.S. are more trusting when paired with in-group members but that this is not the case for subjects from China and Japan, who are more trusting in general, regardless of whom they were paired with. Buchan and Croson (1999) also find variations across genders observing that although participants trust men and women equally, women are seen to reciprocate more than men in Trust Games and are more generous in Dictator Games, findings that are consistent internationally. Another consistency that was found across nationalities in this study was the effect that communication between players had on trust and reciprocation levels, a conclusion also mirrored in other experiments. Roth (1995) found that even simple, seemingly irrelevant conversations significantly increa sed the levels of these social preferences. Regardless of variations across nationality, gender and communication levels, it is apparent that there is a clear connection between identity and social preferences. As we categorise individuals into social categories, we not only presume they possess certain qualities and attributes but we also predict how they react. In the same way we use metaperspectives to shape our own actions based on vague notions of the social identities of others, we also use these imperfect images to form inherently imperfect expectations of future interactions. The perception and reality can at times be irreconcilable and yet any initial interaction uses this as its basis. McCall and Simmons (1978) put forward the idea that any interaction that takes place is solely based on images that are constructed in the minds of those interacting. Taking into account the inaccuracy of these constructs when strangers interact, we can see how this translates into the laymans term of prejudice, a concept closely linke d with trust. The concept of trust, as mentioned earlier is based on confidence and at the heart of confidence is a deep reliance on predictions and expectations which are in turn based on the rough identities that we perceive others to possess. This results in great variance in trust levels which, although proven in studies referred to above, is readily seen in everyday life. Trust can be unquestioned with interactions with family members and friends but displayed with lesser and lesser extents to strangers and those who we perceive as untrustworthy. Just as signalling is used in the employment markets, so it is in our trust-dependant interactions. One may ask a well-dressed, polite and friendly stranger to watch over some personal belongings in a library but may be loath to leave anything unattended when in the presence of hooded youth. The hood can be seen as a signal that the wearer is dangerous and cannot be trusted. It is perceived as the expression of an identity, the perception of which ca n influence our attitudes and behaviour. The studies above also show that identity can greatly affect reciprocity, inequity aversion and altruism. Experiments based around group membership, however minimal, show the great influence groups have on these social preferences. One explanation of this is the concept of metaperspectives, in that individuals are more generous in experimental games because they believe that their counterpart expects them to be. Akerlofs (1997:1008) model of social distance also sheds some light on this by theorising that individuals benefit from lesser amounts of social distance between them and thus have the incentive to conform to expectations, what he labels The Conformist Model. A reduction of social distance between players can also be achieved by perceived acts of kindness and so experimental game players may be willing to sacrifice monetary gains so as to achieve social gains with another player. This incentive however, is again based on social distance and those players who feel socially far apart may feel no need to become socially closer, a feeling that is ultimately merely based on their perception of the current social distance and social identities. Two significant ways in which individuals identify themselves and others is by their nationality and gender. At the outset of mankinds evolution, gender has been a universal divider of the human race, preceding all other identities. Rooted in our biology, gender is the simplest form of classification, but its implications are far more wide-reaching than simple physiology. To the opposite sex, gender implies certain generalised roles, attitudes, commitments, experiences and lifestyles. The source of such clear social stereotypes is only in part biological and many academics are of the belief that behavioural and psychological differences are created and perpetuated by unbalanced power and privilege structures in society (Flax 1990). The amplification of social distance is caused by the notion that qualities are gender specific, with masculinity and femininity being attributes in themselves, and the fact that men and women are commonly associated with their relative positions in both f amily life and work life. Lockheed (1985) supposes that women are conceived as compliant followers and men dominant leaders only because of the common minority and majority balance that is common in social and work situations. The large disparity between the social identity and actual realities of members of the opposite sex provides a good opportunity to explore to what extent interaction is based on unqualified perceptions and to map the effect of variations in this perception. Unlike gender identities, nationalism is a relatively new force in the world (Smith 1995). It can be seen as a group identity that has transcended some cultures, as seen in the ethnically diverse nations such as India and Russia, but divided others as seen in the cases of North and South Korea and the Taiwanese and Chinese separation and is manifested in positive discrimination towards fellow nationals and negative discrimination towards foreigners (Macesich, 1985). Breton (1964:378) notes that governments utilise nationalistic instruments†¦ for the purpose of increasing the share of assets in a given assets in a given territory owned by the nationals of that territory. Breton (1964) also observes that nationalistic redistribution of investment and capital results in a lower rate of return than would be realised if resources were allocated efficiently, an observation that draws parallels with the nature of social preferences on a much larger scale. The practice of promoting thes e nationalistic policies that are not beneficial to certain population segments is centred on the formation of a nation-wide group identity that promotes solidarity in the same way that smaller scale groups do. The membership of these nation-groups is defined according to several commonalities. Members share an economy, a historic territory, myths and memories, a public culture, and a set of legal rights (Smith 1991). What is clear from this definition is the lack of consistent personal characteristics, illustrating that members of a nation-group vary considerably in their social and personal identities. The minimal nature of the nation-group is accepted by many academics, some seeing nationalism as an ironic tool that encourages members to appreciate things that are national for the mere fact that it is national (Breton 1964). Karl Deutsch (1969:3) aptly described a nation as a group of people united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours, evoking the notion that national identity is a predominately social construct inaccurately perceived to be connected to common characteristics, descent and preferences. (Smith 1996) stresses that the perception of ones own nationality and that of others is inherently only emotional, implying a subjective disregard for objective considerations that results in large social distances between foreigners and nationals, and smaller social distances between nationals. However erroneous, the very substantial influence nationality exerts can be seen through the stereotypical actions of distrusting of foreigners and supporting fellow country-men, making nationality another excellent candidate identity to examine how variations in perceived identity cause variations in the social preferences displayed. Experimental Design and Implementation It is social identity and its inherently variable quality that is at the heart of this study. It is this studys aim to discover in what way the perception of this identity can affect the extent that social preferences are displayed and whether or not a shift of focus from one form of social identity to another will cause a change in degree of social preferences manifested. Given its ability to expose these preferences, an extension of the Trust Game is used Effects of Manipulating Individual Identity Effects of Manipulating Individual Identity Abstract: This study examined how changing the perception of social distance changed the way in which subjects interacted in the Trust Game specifically looking into the social preferences they displayed. A discussion of both economic and sociological research demonstrates the inherent variability of social identity and social distance and the interconnected nature these concepts have with social preferences. A two-stage experiment involving subjects of different nationalities and genders was carried out with a different identity focus in each stage. Findings show that subjects exhibit greater social preferences when interacting with those of a similar focused identity yet the degrees of these preferences displayed vary in accordance to the identity focus. Results suggest that social distance, although easily manipulated, is a powerful force in interactions. The results are consistent with previous studies into group membership, identity, nationality, gender and social preferences. Given this studys far-reaching implications it should be viewed as the premise for future study of this topic. Introduction The concept of social distance as elucidated by Akerlof (1997) is profoundly linked with social identity and social preferences. It is the differences in individuals social identities, including for example, race, gender, class and status, that determine the benefits of interaction and to what extent of social preferences are displayed. Yet when individuals are not entirely familiar with each other, the perception of social identities is based on very few observations and is therefore not entirely accurate. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether or not variations in the perception of social identity, and thus social distance, will affect the extent to which social preferences are manifested. Studies on the effect of identity are in no way new. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) studied its relevance and magnitude with regards to gender discrimination in the workplace, poverty and social exclusion, and the household division of labour. Akerlof (1997) also studied the effect of social distance, asserting that the social identity of individuals can substantially affect their interactions. What has not been tested, however, is to what extent identity is merely a perception. Individuals can and do possess multiple identities varying in dominance from situation to situation. The hypothesis of this paper is that social preferences are relevant in experimental games, but these are dependent on how each player perceives the others social identity, a perception that is inherently variable. Players react with varying degrees of self-interest according to the identity they perceive, even when identical character profiles are involved. Recent economic studies fail to sufficiently incorporate current sociological thinking as to the nature of social identity and although this study will give evidence for the relevance of social distance in determining degrees of social preferences, it will attempt to shed light on individuals inconsistent perception of the distance between them. In order to add weight to this position, an experiment was organised in which participants of various profiles were invited to play the Trust Game. Each game was played face-to-face with no verbal communication. The experiment was divided into two stages, a nationality focused stage and a gender focused stage. Each participant played the game twice and never with the same opposing player. Before each game, participants were assigned to certain rooms in which video clips were played depending on the identity focused on. In the first stage, participants were split into three rooms, one for each nationality present: Scottish, English and Chinese. After one play of the Trust Game, the experiment commenced its second stage and participants were split into two rooms, one for each gender, and again asked to play the game. The results show that there is significant variation in the degrees of social preferences displayed depending on the identity being focused on hereafter referred to as the focused identity. When nationality was the focused identity, those with this common identity exhibited greater social preferences than those of differing nationalities, regardless of gender. When gender was the focused identity, those with this common identity exhibited greater social preferences than those of differing gender, regardless, to some extent, of nationality. This lack of consistency shows that the perception of social distance is not a constant through both stages and yet it is still proves to be a determining factor in how players interact. The following content of this paper is arranged into four sections. Section 2 will address the relevant literature with regards to social preferences and identity, showing their relevance, interconnected nature and inherent variability, discussing the application of various theories in the context of this study. Section 3 will describe the design and implementation of the experiment used in this study with the results, analysis and comparisons to similar studies presented in Section 4. An interpretation of these results and further conclusions will be offered in Section 5. Theories of Preferences and Identity To clearly understand the argument presented, a holistic discussion of current theories must be embarked upon. The relevance of social preferences and the forms of their analysis through experimental games will be examined in this section to create the context in which this study is placed. The concepts of identity and how they shape perceptions and interactions will then be considered before discussing their relationship with social preferences. Social Preferences The assumption that man is motivated by self-interest is one that has dominated economic theory and is indeed fundamental to the very ideology of the vast majority of economists. As Adam Smith (1910:13) suggests, It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. Inherent in this analogy is the implication that self-interest is the primary motivator in our economic interactions, and it is through this impulse that equilibria are formed. In Game Theory, the Nash Equilibrium is obtained by each player assuming the other possesses purely selfish motives. This assumption, however, is not always consistent with reality. Many factors influence an individuals decisions and it is evident that the maximisation of material gain is not always a dominating motivation. Some of the factors influencing an individuals decisions can relate to social status, group membership, inequity aversion, reciprocity, s pite, envy, altruism and identity. These factors form a preference set, referred to in this study as social preferences. Although the theory of self-interest has been ingrained in traditional economics, modern economists have increasingly questioned this supposition. In fact the traditional authors of this theory were also wary of its realism. Even though Edgeworth (1881:16) writes that the first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest, he concedes that Man is, in reality, for the most part an impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian, (Edgeworth 1881:104). It is evident that we are influenced by unselfish motives in our interactions with others and it follows that these interactions will in many circumstances involve material profit and loss. This is the realm of social preferences. Amartya Sen (1977:336), in his seminal paper on the irrationality of traditional preference theory states that the purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron. He argues that theories that do not encompass the influence of sympathy and our commitment to it are incomplete. It is the result of this basic emotion that our social norms, laws and codes of conduct are formed and without which no society would be feasible (Johansen 1977). In various studies into social preferences, it is seen that they are comprised of multiple aspects. Reciprocity, inequity aversion, altruism and trust are all basic components of this preference set (Andreoni et al. 2002). When kindness or animosity is shown, the impulse exists to reciprocate in like manner. When inequity exists, the urge exists to rebel against it. Altruism is the virtue that depends on no form of expected gain or reciprocity, the purest form of good will. Trust is the confidence in the future actions of another and is arguably the most variable of the social preferences and one that will be revisited in this study. Each of these attributes are far from abstract philosophical concepts, exert great influence on our economic interactions. Agell and Lundberg (1995) discovered that as a result of workers being influenced by fairness and equity customs, wage cuts were often unprofitable, with workers objecting to an unfair action. This can have a direct impact on the extent that a company vertically integrates, with out-sourcing often being far more viable given the reciprocal attitude of workers. Bewley (1999) also noted that a firms policy can affect worker morale and as such companies must take into account the perceived fairness of their policies. The extent of tax evasion has also been correlated to how fair it is perceived, and in fact the entire structure of tax systems are thoroughly debated and altered according to the principles of equity and merit (Seidl and Traub 2002). The perception of unreciprocated generosity has been one of the causes of the general reduction in support from the US w elfare state. People are disinclined to support welfare structures that give the impression that they are helping a poor segment of society that refuse to help themselves, content to live off the goodwill of others (Bowles and Gintis 2000). Fukuyama (1995) also correlates economic prosperity with higher levels of trust, suggesting that social preferences are a very powerful force even in the current global economic system. Sequential games Although the examples given are wide-ranging in scope, involving relatively large economic issues, social preferences have also been proven to have a significant effect on individual interactions. Previously experimental games have been used to prove the dominating forces of self-interest, the equilibria of these experiments being calculated by assuming that all agents were exclusively self-interested (Fehr and Schmict, 2001). Recently, economists have carried out several experiments involving non-cooperative games that contradict this presumption. Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) were among the first to create a game that did just this. It is called the Ultimatum Game. There are two players in the game, one a Proposer and one a Responder. The Proposer must divide an amount of money X between the two players, offering the Responder any amount Y = X. If Responder accepts, the Proposer receives the remaining money X – Y, if they reject, both receive nothing. Under self-interested preferences, the efficient equilibrium is the one in which the Proposer gives the least amount possible to the Responder, who will accept any amount. In reality however, offers of less than a fifth of X are rejected about half time and Proposers anticipating this generally offer around 30 to 50 percent of X (Hoffman et al. 1996). This result clearly shows that factors other than self-interest are at play. It would be reasonable to assume that altruism and reciprocity both play a part in the decision-making process of both players. The Proposer may be influenced by a code of morals and a concept of fairness to offer more than the standard equilibrium distribution. The P roposer must also take into account the Responders sense of reciprocity and animosity towards a seemingly unfair distribution. Although the Responder is under no monetary incentive to reject a low offer, yet his social preferences mean that he is able to achieve some utility by spiting the Proposer, thereby valuing a certain amount of reciprocity over monetary value. Given the fact that the Proposers actions may be driven only by the fear of reciprocity and no sense of altruism, it is worthwhile to look into the Dictators Game first introduced by Kahneman et al. (1986) and refined by Forsythe et al. (1994). In this game, the Responder, now called the Recipient, is not given the option to accept or refuse the amount given by the Proposer. If the Proposer is motivated by self-interested alone, they will offer nothing to the Recipient but as many experiments have shown, this is not always the case. Henrich et al. (2001) find that in most dictator game experiments there is a primary mode offer of zero percent of the Proposers total wealth and a secondary mode offer of 50 percent. Some groups show a primary mode offer of 20 percent and a secondary mode of 50 percent providing strong evidence of inequity aversion. In addition to supporting the notion that man is not exclusively self-interested, studies also confirm that fear of reciprocity is present i n the Ultimatum Game and that Proposers apply backwards induction with average offers being lower in the Dictator Game (Roth et al. 1991). The Trust Game, developed by Berg et al. (1995) is a game that can be used to test the presence of altruism, inequity aversion, reciprocity and its namesake, trust. The game is played with an Investor and a Trustee, with the former being given an initial endowment of X and the latter given nothing. The Investor is then able to give any amount Y between 0 and X. The amount the Trustee receives will be tripled, amounting to 3Y. The Trustee is then given the option to give any amount Z between 0 and 3Y back to the Investor thereby making the payoffs of the Investor and the Trustee X – Y + Z and 3Y – Z respectively. The Trustee is under no monetary incentive to return any amount and as such, under strictly self-interested preferences the Investor will predict this and give the Trustee nothing but, as with the Ultimatum and Dictator Games, studies show that many players of the Trust Game deviate from this equilibrium. Berg et al. (1995) find that almost all Investors give so me amount of money to the Trustee and that a substantial number of Trustees return at least the same amount and that a third even returned more than they received. The amount returned also increases with the amount given thus supporting the theory that reciprocity is an integral part of many preference sets. Investors and Trustees are able to display inequity aversion by choosing to give or return amounts that will equalise final payoffs. Trustees can also display altruism by returning anything over and above the amount needed to equalise payoffs. It is interesting to note that there is substantial variation in the amounts given, with no clear average amount entrusted. The variation is not unsurprising, however, given the inherent inconsistency in levels of trust that individuals demonstrate in their interactions with various individuals. In society, trust placed in an individual is dependent on who that individual is or, in other terms, trust placed is dependent on the perceived id entity of the individual in question. Identity Identity, at its most fundamental level, is at the base of all human interaction. For an individual to interact with another, the individual must have a clear concept of both himself and of the other. It is in the consideration of these two concepts that decisions are made. Descartes (1912:167) famously stated †¦I think, therefore I am, and in doing so sparked off the philosophical debate on what truly directs our thoughts and actions. Hume (1888) further develops this by exploring our perception of ourselves, our identity. It was his belief that we can only perceive ourselves, and build our identity, by categorisation in the light of selected characteristics and never perceive our true reality in objective terms. It is out-with the bounds of this study to discuss in depth the sociological and psychological complexities of this topic, yet it is worth-while bringing to light some key concepts to further the understanding of the interactions between this studys participants. An identity is a tool of recognition. It allows us to recognise individuals, categories, groups and types of individuals, Wiley (1994:130). More than this, it is also a tool of categorisation and emotional cues. It implies a conscious awareness by members of a group, some positive or negative emotional feelings towards the characteristics which members of a group perceive themselves as sharing and in which they perceive themselves as differing from others, Mennell (1994:177). Goffman (1968) further expounds these aspects of recognition by dividing identity into three sections: the personal identity, the ego identity and the social identity. The personal identity is the unique identification that each individual possesses to differentiate themselves technically, legally and realistically from all others. The ego identity is a purely subjective observation that is built from a multitude of social experiences and is a sense of ones own particular state and nature. The social identity pr ovides a way of categorising people and connects each person with a set of attributes and characteristics thought to be in keeping with the members of their respective categories. Individuals that possess commonalities in the form of thought, action, nature, experience or lifestyle can all be grouped into various social identities. Examples of social identities are nationality, gender, music-taste, age, profession and political views. It is important to stress that while individuals may only hold one personal and ego identity, they are able to juggle multiple social identities which have varying degrees of focus from situation to situation. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) put forward the theorem that our perception of our ego identity can have a significant influence on our decisions and actions. Their theorem sheds light on a number of seemingly irrational choices. Actions that are of apparent detriment to an individual can be viewed as a form of behaviour that it used to create a more unique self identity. Similarly, steps may be taken to symbolise the assumption of a particular identity or the membership of a certain group, be they conscious or otherwise. Men do not generally wear dresses, and as such this behavioural code is unconsciously subscribed to by the majority of men. Any behaviour to the contrary poses a challenge not merely to the social norm, but to the identity of manhood itself. Attempts to manipulate an individuals decisions can be based on the notion of identity. In order to influence people to buy their products, companies create advertisements that often show a stylised form of a particular identity that people may aspire to. Finally, as identity can play such a large role in determining our economic decisions and behaviour, and assuming that individuals can choose their own identity, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) conclude that identity choices can be a major factor in a persons overall economic well-being, a conclusion strengthened by the theory of role-identities. It is difficult to determine to what extent our identity is prescriptive or descriptive in relation to our own actions, but nevertheless the dual concepts of identity and role are deeply interconnected. Lyman and Scott (1970:136) clarify this link by stating that roles are identities mobilised in a specific situation; whereas role is always situationally specific, identities are trans-situational. By assuming an identity, we also assume a role. Despite that the fact that this role varies from situation to situation, it is at all times consistent with the assumed identity. It is from this notion that expectations and metaperspectives are formed. Laing et al. (1966) pioneered the belief that it is not I but you that is important. More specifically they claimed that we are all deeply influenced by considering our view of others view of ourselves and in such a way develop a role-performance that conforms to the expectation others have of our behaviour so as to receive positive feedback o r avoid negative feedback. In order to assess these expectations and act accordingly, we must first judge what these expectations are. With strangers, this is problematic, and as such we orient ourselves toward them in terms only of the ill-specified contours of their social roles, (McCall and Simmons, 1978:70). In this respect, we are only able to form rough estimations of a persons true identity and thereby rely on our perception of how they fit into vague boundaries of social identities. When we perceive people this way, our perception of the attributes they possess as ascribed by their social identity is often completely arbitrary when viewed in the context of an objective character analysis. The perception and reality can at times be poles apart, decreasing in accuracy with increasing social distance. Identities and Social Preferences Akerlof (1997) defined social distance as a measure of social proximity between individuals. The model he created summarises that people gain benefits from interacting to those socially closer to themselves, with these benefits decreasing with isolation. This model is supported by empirical evidence that suggests that trust and reciprocity are linked with social connection and that members of the same nationality and race exhibit greater degrees of these attributes towards one another (Glaeser et al. 1999). A common method of analysing social distance is through the construction of groups in experiments and many studies of this kind have provided quite significant results. Studying the effects of group membership on cooperation, Orbell et al. (1988) find that subjects are far more likely to cooperate with in-group members than out-group members, with 79% of participants showing cooperation with the former and only 30% showing cooperation with the latter. Through using a variation on the dictator game, Frey and Bohnet (1997) also showed how group membership affects social preferences. The experiment observed that in-group members were allocated far more of the total endowment than out-group members suggesting some correlation with membership and altruism and inequity aversion. An important finding of the literature on the topic of group membership is that subjects react to membership in a very subjective manner, disregarding objective considerations. Billing and Tajfel (1973) observe that the even most minimal connections within a group still give rise to in-group positive discrimination. Although subjects realised that the basis of group composition wa s entirely random, they still discriminated toward their fellow members in a very significant way. The fact that the weakest bonds are able to create positive in-group interaction is an important consideration when examining the relation between perceptions of social identity and expressions of social preferences. While group membership is a powerful force, transnational studies have shown that the cooperation inducing group mentality is not a universally consistent attribute. Buchan, Croson and Johnson (1999) find that subjects from the U.S. are more trusting when paired with in-group members but that this is not the case for subjects from China and Japan, who are more trusting in general, regardless of whom they were paired with. Buchan and Croson (1999) also find variations across genders observing that although participants trust men and women equally, women are seen to reciprocate more than men in Trust Games and are more generous in Dictator Games, findings that are consistent internationally. Another consistency that was found across nationalities in this study was the effect that communication between players had on trust and reciprocation levels, a conclusion also mirrored in other experiments. Roth (1995) found that even simple, seemingly irrelevant conversations significantly increa sed the levels of these social preferences. Regardless of variations across nationality, gender and communication levels, it is apparent that there is a clear connection between identity and social preferences. As we categorise individuals into social categories, we not only presume they possess certain qualities and attributes but we also predict how they react. In the same way we use metaperspectives to shape our own actions based on vague notions of the social identities of others, we also use these imperfect images to form inherently imperfect expectations of future interactions. The perception and reality can at times be irreconcilable and yet any initial interaction uses this as its basis. McCall and Simmons (1978) put forward the idea that any interaction that takes place is solely based on images that are constructed in the minds of those interacting. Taking into account the inaccuracy of these constructs when strangers interact, we can see how this translates into the laymans term of prejudice, a concept closely linke d with trust. The concept of trust, as mentioned earlier is based on confidence and at the heart of confidence is a deep reliance on predictions and expectations which are in turn based on the rough identities that we perceive others to possess. This results in great variance in trust levels which, although proven in studies referred to above, is readily seen in everyday life. Trust can be unquestioned with interactions with family members and friends but displayed with lesser and lesser extents to strangers and those who we perceive as untrustworthy. Just as signalling is used in the employment markets, so it is in our trust-dependant interactions. One may ask a well-dressed, polite and friendly stranger to watch over some personal belongings in a library but may be loath to leave anything unattended when in the presence of hooded youth. The hood can be seen as a signal that the wearer is dangerous and cannot be trusted. It is perceived as the expression of an identity, the perception of which ca n influence our attitudes and behaviour. The studies above also show that identity can greatly affect reciprocity, inequity aversion and altruism. Experiments based around group membership, however minimal, show the great influence groups have on these social preferences. One explanation of this is the concept of metaperspectives, in that individuals are more generous in experimental games because they believe that their counterpart expects them to be. Akerlofs (1997:1008) model of social distance also sheds some light on this by theorising that individuals benefit from lesser amounts of social distance between them and thus have the incentive to conform to expectations, what he labels The Conformist Model. A reduction of social distance between players can also be achieved by perceived acts of kindness and so experimental game players may be willing to sacrifice monetary gains so as to achieve social gains with another player. This incentive however, is again based on social distance and those players who feel socially far apart may feel no need to become socially closer, a feeling that is ultimately merely based on their perception of the current social distance and social identities. Two significant ways in which individuals identify themselves and others is by their nationality and gender. At the outset of mankinds evolution, gender has been a universal divider of the human race, preceding all other identities. Rooted in our biology, gender is the simplest form of classification, but its implications are far more wide-reaching than simple physiology. To the opposite sex, gender implies certain generalised roles, attitudes, commitments, experiences and lifestyles. The source of such clear social stereotypes is only in part biological and many academics are of the belief that behavioural and psychological differences are created and perpetuated by unbalanced power and privilege structures in society (Flax 1990). The amplification of social distance is caused by the notion that qualities are gender specific, with masculinity and femininity being attributes in themselves, and the fact that men and women are commonly associated with their relative positions in both f amily life and work life. Lockheed (1985) supposes that women are conceived as compliant followers and men dominant leaders only because of the common minority and majority balance that is common in social and work situations. The large disparity between the social identity and actual realities of members of the opposite sex provides a good opportunity to explore to what extent interaction is based on unqualified perceptions and to map the effect of variations in this perception. Unlike gender identities, nationalism is a relatively new force in the world (Smith 1995). It can be seen as a group identity that has transcended some cultures, as seen in the ethnically diverse nations such as India and Russia, but divided others as seen in the cases of North and South Korea and the Taiwanese and Chinese separation and is manifested in positive discrimination towards fellow nationals and negative discrimination towards foreigners (Macesich, 1985). Breton (1964:378) notes that governments utilise nationalistic instruments†¦ for the purpose of increasing the share of assets in a given assets in a given territory owned by the nationals of that territory. Breton (1964) also observes that nationalistic redistribution of investment and capital results in a lower rate of return than would be realised if resources were allocated efficiently, an observation that draws parallels with the nature of social preferences on a much larger scale. The practice of promoting thes e nationalistic policies that are not beneficial to certain population segments is centred on the formation of a nation-wide group identity that promotes solidarity in the same way that smaller scale groups do. The membership of these nation-groups is defined according to several commonalities. Members share an economy, a historic territory, myths and memories, a public culture, and a set of legal rights (Smith 1991). What is clear from this definition is the lack of consistent personal characteristics, illustrating that members of a nation-group vary considerably in their social and personal identities. The minimal nature of the nation-group is accepted by many academics, some seeing nationalism as an ironic tool that encourages members to appreciate things that are national for the mere fact that it is national (Breton 1964). Karl Deutsch (1969:3) aptly described a nation as a group of people united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours, evoking the notion that national identity is a predominately social construct inaccurately perceived to be connected to common characteristics, descent and preferences. (Smith 1996) stresses that the perception of ones own nationality and that of others is inherently only emotional, implying a subjective disregard for objective considerations that results in large social distances between foreigners and nationals, and smaller social distances between nationals. However erroneous, the very substantial influence nationality exerts can be seen through the stereotypical actions of distrusting of foreigners and supporting fellow country-men, making nationality another excellent candidate identity to examine how variations in perceived identity cause variations in the social preferences displayed. Experimental Design and Implementation It is social identity and its inherently variable quality that is at the heart of this study. It is this studys aim to discover in what way the perception of this identity can affect the extent that social preferences are displayed and whether or not a shift of focus from one form of social identity to another will cause a change in degree of social preferences manifested. Given its ability to expose these preferences, an extension of the Trust Game is used

Hamilton and Limited Government :: Federalists American History

Hamilton and Limited Government  ·The proposed band would raise $10 million through a public stock offering. The Treasury would hold one fifth of the stock and name one fifth of the directors, but four fifths of the control would fall to private hands. Private investors could purchase shares by paying for three quarters of their value in government bonds. In this way, the bank would capture a significant portion of the recently funded debt and make it available for loans; it would also receive a substantial and steady flow of interest payments for the Treasury. Anyone buying shares under these circumstances had little chance of loosing money. Hamilton and Limited Government  ·Hamilton’s plan to establish a permanent national debt violated the principle of equality among citizens; it seemed to favor the interests of public creditors over those of other Americans. Hamilton’s critics also denounced his proposal for a national band, interpreting it as a dangerous scheme that would give a small, elite group special power to influence the government.  ·Opponents’ strongest argument against the band was their claim of its unconstitutionality. The Constitution gave Congress no specific authorization to issue charters of incorporation  ·Unless Congress adhered to a strict interpretation of the Constitution, critics argue, the central government might oppress the states and trample individual liberties, just as Parliament had done to the colonies  ·The president accepted Hamilton’s cogent argument for a loose interpretation of the Constitution  ·Tariffs doubly injured the majority of citizens, first by imposing heavy import taxes that were passed on to consumers and then by reducing the incentive for American manufacturers to produce goods at a lower cost than imports HAMILTON’S LEGACY  ·Despite the Federalists’ effort to associate themselves with the Constitution they actually favored a â€Å"consolidated† (Centralized) national government instead of a truly federal system with substantial powers left to the states  ·Resentment ran high among those who felt that the government appeared to be rewarding special interests  ·Southern reaction to Hamilton’s program was overwhelmingly negative  ·The Band of the United States had few southern stockholders and it allocated very little capital for loans there THE WHISKY REBELLION  ·Hamilton’s financial program not only sparked an angry political debate in Congress but also helped ignite a civil insurrection called the Whiskey Rebellion  ·Hamilton had recommended an excise tax on domestically produced whiskey. He insisted that his proposal would distribute the expense of financing the national debt evenly across the United States  ·The law furthermore specified that all trials concerning tax evasion be conducted in federal courts Hamilton and Limited Government :: Federalists American History Hamilton and Limited Government  ·The proposed band would raise $10 million through a public stock offering. The Treasury would hold one fifth of the stock and name one fifth of the directors, but four fifths of the control would fall to private hands. Private investors could purchase shares by paying for three quarters of their value in government bonds. In this way, the bank would capture a significant portion of the recently funded debt and make it available for loans; it would also receive a substantial and steady flow of interest payments for the Treasury. Anyone buying shares under these circumstances had little chance of loosing money. Hamilton and Limited Government  ·Hamilton’s plan to establish a permanent national debt violated the principle of equality among citizens; it seemed to favor the interests of public creditors over those of other Americans. Hamilton’s critics also denounced his proposal for a national band, interpreting it as a dangerous scheme that would give a small, elite group special power to influence the government.  ·Opponents’ strongest argument against the band was their claim of its unconstitutionality. The Constitution gave Congress no specific authorization to issue charters of incorporation  ·Unless Congress adhered to a strict interpretation of the Constitution, critics argue, the central government might oppress the states and trample individual liberties, just as Parliament had done to the colonies  ·The president accepted Hamilton’s cogent argument for a loose interpretation of the Constitution  ·Tariffs doubly injured the majority of citizens, first by imposing heavy import taxes that were passed on to consumers and then by reducing the incentive for American manufacturers to produce goods at a lower cost than imports HAMILTON’S LEGACY  ·Despite the Federalists’ effort to associate themselves with the Constitution they actually favored a â€Å"consolidated† (Centralized) national government instead of a truly federal system with substantial powers left to the states  ·Resentment ran high among those who felt that the government appeared to be rewarding special interests  ·Southern reaction to Hamilton’s program was overwhelmingly negative  ·The Band of the United States had few southern stockholders and it allocated very little capital for loans there THE WHISKY REBELLION  ·Hamilton’s financial program not only sparked an angry political debate in Congress but also helped ignite a civil insurrection called the Whiskey Rebellion  ·Hamilton had recommended an excise tax on domestically produced whiskey. He insisted that his proposal would distribute the expense of financing the national debt evenly across the United States  ·The law furthermore specified that all trials concerning tax evasion be conducted in federal courts

Hsbc Scandal

The HSBC scandal shook Europe as a whole! Britain’s largest institutional bank was accused of a â€Å"drugs and gun-running† scandal. The bank failed to monitor a staggering ? 38trillion of money moving across borders from places that could have posed a risk, including the Cayman Islands, Switzerland, Iran, and Mexico. One of the highest noted disregards by the bank was their financial dealings with Al Rajhi, the Saudi Arabian bank that was linked with funding the 9/11 terrorist scheme.Another report showed that the bank accepted ? 9. 6billion in cash over two years from subsidiaries without checking where the money came from, showing blunt disregard for the obviousness of the transactions. Mexican and US authorities warning HSBC that there was a volume limit (? 4. 5billion) in money sent to the US from its Mexican subsidiary that would exemplify â€Å"illegal drug proceeds†. A HSBC officer admitted that the accounts in the Cayman Islands were abused by â€Å"or ganized crime†, ? 1. 3billion total.The bank became the subject of a US senate investigation, and they dropped a 335 page report that accused the bank of ignoring all of the warning and safeguards that should have stopped the laundering of money from Mexico, Iran and Syria. In December they agreed on a settlement to pay a penalty of ? 1. 2 billion that would further scorch their already diminished reputation. With the settlement of the fee, comes the bank admitting to violating US laws meant to prohibit money laundering including the Bank Secrecy Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act.When presented with the 335 page senate report, the head of HSBC’s compliance division, David Bagley, quit in front of the Senate committee. Being at his post since 2002, one can understand why he resigned when pressed with these concerns. He felt guilty being with the bank for so long and did not want to take responsibility for the actions and accusations of the bank. The affair is also a n embarrassment for David Cameron, because his trade envoy Stephen Green chaired HSBC during the period covered by the allegations.Lord (Barron) Green is probably the person most to blame for these disregards for policy on money laundering and regulations. He was the chief executive and the executive chairman of HSBC. Being a trade minister, it was his duty to ensure that the issues brought to the senate’s attention would be regulated for legality concerns. In failing to successfully do so, the fault of the accusations falls on his lap. The regulators of money laundering actively, domestically, and internationally are the countries of the FATF. Forming in 1989, the FATF has 3 primary functions with regard to money laundering.These 3 functions are monitoring member’s implementation of anit-money laundering measures, review and report trends and techniques of laundering, and promote standards globally. Combined with a unified effort within these countries, the US being o ne of the main ones, money laundering activities will be noted quickly before large scale transactions may go through unnoticed and through the means of illegal activities. The US promotes the most laws against these sorts of offensives. HSBC needs to come to a complete â€Å"retake†.All historical transactions, accounts, and services need to be reviewed and mended to meet the golden standard of banking that they have held themselves to ever since becoming the primary bank of Europe. With the removal and replacement of key executive level positions, they may bring in new, fresh minds and with that comes a new approach to the regulating of the activities of the bank. In short, re-staffing the bank with new executives over the previous ones shows the public that the bank takes serious note to what has happened and a serious effort to mend and fix it. Shipman, T. & Davies, R. (2012, July 7). Hsbc let drug gangs launder millions: First barclays, now britain. Retrieved from http:/ /www. dailymail. co. uk/news/article-2174785/HSBC-scandal-Britains-biggest-bank-let-drug-gangs-launder-millions–faces-640million-fine. html (n. d. ). Retrieved from http://www. guardian. co. uk/business/2012/dec/10/standard-chartered-settle-iran-sanctions Yost, P. , & Pylas, P. (2012, December 11). Hsbc to pay $1. 9 billion to settle money-laundering scandal. Retrieved from http://www. salon. com/2012/12/11/hsbc_to_pay_1_9bn_to_settle_money_laundering_scandal/

Maltrato(General) Essays - Abraham Senior, Castilians, Free Essays

Maltrato(General) Essays - Abraham Senior, Castilians, Free Essays Maltrato(General) Yo voy a empezar explicando sobre el tema del maltrato a nios y adolecentes. Hay muchos actos violentos cometidos en el hogar entre miembros de una familia. En la dcada de 1970 las feministas analizaron el alcance de la violencia intrafamiliar (considerada como un fenmeno exclusivamente masculino) y se crearon centros de acogida y de ayuda para las mujeres maltratadas y para sus hijos. El trmino maltrato infantil abarca una amplia gama de acciones que causan dao fsico, emocional o mental en nios de cualquier edad. Sin embargo, el tipo de maltrato infligido vara con la edad del nio. Los malos tratos en bebs y nios en edad preescolar suelen producir fracturas, quemaduras y heridas intencionadas. En casi todos los casos de acoso sexual el agresor suele ser un hombre y la vctima una nia en edad escolar o adolescente. Sin embargo, en los ltimos tiempos est aumentando el nmero de nios varones en edad preescolar que sufren este tipo de maltrato. lo largo de la historia, el patriarcado, segn el movimiento feminista, ha puesto el poder en manos de maridos y padres en cualquier relacin conyugal o de pareja. El suttee entre los hindes (que exige que la viuda se ofrezca en la pira funeraria de su marido), el infanticidio femenino en la cultura china e india dominadas por hombres, los matrimonios concertados entre los musulmanes, que pueden llevar al asesinato o a la tortura de la mujer, y la esclavitud domstica en el nuevo hogar indican la presencia endmica de sexismo y violencia intrafamiliar masculina. Se desconoce si este tipo de violencia es un fenmeno en alza o en baja, incluso en pases donde hoy existe un mayor nmero de denuncias y de registros que en pocas anteriores. Por un lado, es probable que haya una mayor predisposicin a denunciar estos hechos al existir una mayor independencia femenina, ms oportunidades de trabajo fuera del hogar, mayor conciencia feminista y ms posibilidades de anticoncepcin. Por otro lado, la motivacin para la violencia es menor al existir una mayor libertad de eleccin de compaero, menos matrimonios forzados y una mayor emancipacin de la mujer en cuanto a propiedad, estudios y divorcio. Ninguno de estos elementos puede ser evaluado con exactitud. La tecnologa de la informacin actual ayuda a recopilar datos, pero en cambio resulta difcil conocer los procesos y los antecedentes. Algunas feministas radicales opinan que es la familia la raz del problema y que la solucin est en liberarse del hombre, mientras que en el extremo opuesto otros opinan que la mu jer debe limitarse a su papel de ama de casa y madre. Aunque no puede afirmarse que toda la violencia sea cometida por hombres, s ocurre as en la mayora de los casos. A veces son el padre y la madre juntos quienes cometen las agresiones, como en el caso de malos tratos a los hijos. La patologa del maltrato infantil, desgraciadamente, no tiene fin.

How to Conjugate Reconnaître (to Recognize) in French

How to Conjugate Reconnaà ®tre (to Recognize) in French When you want to say I recognized or we will recognize in French, youll use the verb  reconnaà ®tre. In order to change it into the past or future tense, however, you will need to know its conjugations. This may not be the easiest French lesson, but we will show you how to form the essential forms of  reconnaà ®re  that youll need. The Basic Conjugations of  Reconnaà ®tre In French, there are easy verb conjugations and some that are more of a challenge. Reconnaà ®tre falls into the latter category. Thats because it is an irregular verb, so it does not follow a common rule in the conjugations. However, nearly all French verbs ending in -aà ®tre are conjugated this way. If you study a few together, each can be a little easier. For  reconnaà ®tre, the verb stem (or radical) is  reconn-. To this, you will add a variety of endings that match both the subject pronoun and the tense. This chart will help you learn the basics, including the common present, future, and imperfect past tenses. As an example, I recognize is  je reconnais  and we will recognize is  nous reconnaà ®trons. Practicing these in context will help you memorize them. Present Future Imperfect je reconnais reconnatrai reconnaissais tu reconnais reconnatras reconnaissais il reconnat reconnatra reconnaissait nous reconnaissons reconnatrons reconnaissions vous reconnaissez reconnatrez reconnaissiez ils reconnaissent reconnatront reconnaissaient The Present Participle of  Reconnaà ®tre The  present participle  of  reconnaà ®tre  is  reconnaissant. It is a verb, though there are some circumstances in which you can use it as an adjective or noun as well. Reconnaà ®tre  in the Compound Past Tense The compound past tense in French is called the  passà © composà ©. It requires use of the  past participle  reconnu  and the present tense conjugate of the auxiliary verb  avoir. For example, I recognized is  jai reconnu  and we recognized is  nous avons reconnu. More Simple Conjugations of  Reconnaà ®tre When youre unsure if you recognize something, you might use  the subjunctive verb mood. On the other hand, if youll only recognize something if something else happens, you can use  the conditional. In formal literature, you will find either the passà © simple  or  the imperfect subjunctive  forms of  reconnaà ®tre. Subjunctive Conditional Pass Simple Imperfect Subjunctive je reconnaisse reconnatrais reconnus reconnusse tu reconnaisses reconnatrais reconnus reconnusses il reconnaisse reconnatrait reconnut reconnt nous reconnaissions reconnatrions reconnmes reconnussions vous reconnaissiez reconnatriez reconntes reconnussiez ils reconnaissent reconnatraient reconnurent reconnussent The French imperative  drops all formality and skips the subject pronoun. When using  reconnaà ®tre  in direct statements, you can simplify it from  tu  reconnais  to  reconnais. Imperative (tu) reconnais (nous) reconnaissons (vous) reconnaissez